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Combining Anecdotal and Statistical Evidence in Real-Life
Discourse: Comprehension and Persuasiveness
Jos Hornikx
Centre for Language Studies Communication and Information Studies, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the
Netherlands
ABSTRACT
The persuasiveness of anecdotal evidence and statistical evidence has been
investigated in a large number of studies, but the combination of anecdotal
and statistical evidence has hardly received research attention. The present
experimental study therefore investigated the persuasiveness of this combina-
tion. It also examined whether the quality of anecdotal evidence affects
persuasiveness and to what extent people comprehend the combination of
anecdotal and statistical evidence. In an experiment, people read a realistic
persuasive message that was relevant to them. Results showed that anecdotal
evidence does not benefit from the inclusion of statistical evidence or from its
intrinsic quality. The analysis of readers’ cognitive thoughts showed that only
some participants comprehended the relationship between anecdotal and
statistical evidence.
Introduction
When describing recent phenomena in the world or highlighting urgent problems, newsmakers and
influencers often use base-rate statistics to demonstrate the large-scale impact of a phenomenon and
use narratives to exemplify it (Gibson, Callison, & Zillmann, 2011; Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). For
instance, news about the impact of the financial crisis on households may include both the
percentage of households with financial difficulties and a cover story about one family facing that
crisis. A brochure urging readers to support children in Africa may underline the scope of the
problem with statistics and directly speak to the reader’s heart with a story about a child’s difficult
situation.
The two strategies seem to have a different appeal. The strength of base rates (statistics, or
statistical evidence) lies in showing how widespread a certain phenomenon is. The appeal of
exemplars (case histories, narrative evidence, story evidence, or anecdotal evidence) is to describe
one concrete event. In journalism large numbers of studies have investigated the combined use of
base rates and exemplars (for a review, see Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). These studies have aimed to
examine how readers or listeners perceive incidence rates of events in the news. Base rates and
exemplars are not only used in relatively objective news reporting; they are also used in a persuasive
setting, aiming to convince readers or listeners of a certain standpoint. However, research on the
combination of base rates and exemplars in this setting is scarce (see Allen et al., 2000). Therefore,
the present article reports on a study examining the persuasive impact of the combination of base
rates (statistical evidence) and exemplars (anecdotal evidence). It investigates three important
questions. First, does an anecdote have more impact if the sample from which it is taken is also
presented (i.e., statistical evidence)? Second, does an anecdote have more impact if it is similar to the
advocated case in the message? Studies have demonstrated such impact (e.g., Hoeken & Hustinx,
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2009) but have not examined the issue in a realistic setting with a message relevant to readers. Third,
the present study examines not only persuasion but also the comprehension of the combination of
an anecdote and a corresponding sample in statistical evidence. This unique comprehension
perspective is studied in a real-life setting of discourse about environmental issues.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, the literature on the persuasiveness of
anecdotal and statistical evidence, and of their combination, is reviewed. Second, it is explained how
the similarity of anecdotal evidence with the case it supports may impact its persuasiveness. Finally,
the importance of studying the comprehension of the combination of anecdotal and statistical
evidence is underlined.
Anecdotal and statistical evidence
In diverse fields, from advertising and argumentation to cognitive psychology and mass communication,
researchers have long been interested in the impact of the kind of data in messages on readers’ beliefs and
attitudes. These data have often been labeled “evidence,” defined as “data (facts or opinions) presented as
proof for an assertion” (Reynolds & Reynolds, 2002, p. 429). The persuasiveness of different types of
evidence has been empirically investigated for more than 60 years, attracting considerable research
attention, from what is probably the first empirical study (Cathcart, 1955) until more recent investigations
(e.g., Han & Fink, 2012; Hornikx & Ter Haar, 2013; Kim et al., 2012). These empirical studies have inspired
critical analyses (e.g., Hornikx, 2007; Kellermann, 1980) and reviews (e.g., Allen & Preiss, 1997; Baesler &
Burgoon, 1994; Reinard, 1988).
Four types of evidence have commonly been distinguished: anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert
evidence. Anecdotal (or narrative) evidence consists of one case, whereas statistical evidence consists of
numerical information about a large number of cases. Causal evidence consists of an explanation, and
expert evidence consists of a confirmation by an expert. The distinction between different types of
evidence originates from debate handbooks aiming at educating students for a legal career (e.g., Warnick
& Inch, 1989). Inspired by these handbooks, experimental studies in the field of communication first
compared the persuasiveness of anecdotal, statistical, and expert evidence (see Reinard, 1988). Later
experiments added causal evidence to the comparison (Slusher & Anderson, 1996).
Most studies have compared the persuasiveness of anecdotal evidence versus statistical evidence.
Their findings have been summarized in narrative reviews (Baesler & Burgoon, 1994; Hornikx, 2005)
and meta-analyses (Allen & Preiss, 1997; Zebregs, Van den Putte, Neijens, & De Graaf, 2015). Allen
and Preiss (1997) included 16 comparisons in their analysis and concluded that statistical evidence is
more persuasive than anecdotal evidence. More recently, Zebregs et al. (2015) ran a similar analysis,
based on 15 (partly different) comparisons. Their analysis was done for different persuasion
measures separately, as anecdotal evidence has been said to be particularly powerful on behavioral
intentions (see Kopfman, Smith, Yun, & Hodges, 1998). The meta-analysis of Zebregs et al. (2015)
showed that whereas statistical evidence had more impact on beliefs and attitudes than anecdotal
evidence, anecdotal evidence was found to lead to higher levels of intention than statistical evidence.
These meta-analytic results underline that both types of evidence have their merits. Allen et al.
(2000, p. 332), however, observe that “current research treats the issue as though the use of evidence
in a message requires a tradeoff, as if the use of one form precludes the use of another form of
evidence.” It makes sense to investigate the impact of using both statistical and anecdotal evidence.
In their additive model for the effectiveness of evidence, Kim et al. (2012) argue that a larger number
of pieces of evidence is expected to generate higher persuasiveness than a single piece of evidence.
Combining anecdotal or statistical evidence with expert evidence, they found some support for their
additive model. The combination of statistical and anecdotal evidence, however, is much more
natural: Anecdotal evidence is often an example taken from the sample of cases presented as
statistical evidence. Although the importance of examining the impact of the combination of
anecdotal and statistical evidence has been regularly underlined (Allen & Preiss, 1997; Kopfman
et al., 1998; Lindsey & Yun, 2003), it has received very limited attention. Allen et al. (2000) is
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probably the only examination. They compared anecdotal evidence, statistical evidence, and the
combination of anecdotal with statistical evidence and reported that the combination was more
persuasive than either of the two types of evidence in isolation.
In journalism studies, the combination of statistical evidence and anecdotal evidence has been widely
examined under the heading of base-rate information and exemplars. News reports generally use both
types of evidence to demonstrate certain phenomena (Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). The relevant question
was how readers assess incidence rates depending on a given base rate and a handful of exemplars.
Typically, the exemplars were or were not consistent with the base rate (e.g., Brosius & Bathelt, 1994;
Gibson et al., 2011). For instance, in Gibson et al. (2011) the base rate stated that 67% (or 33%) of people
who traveled to a specific African country contracted traveler’s diarrhea. There were nine exemplars of
persons, six of whom reported suffering from traveler’s diarrhea. This distribution was consistent with
the base rate in one condition (6 of 9 = 67%) but not in the other (i.e., 33%). In these kinds of studies,
participants have been found to generally follow the distribution in the exemplars and not the base-rate
information.
From a theoretical perspective, exemplification has a strong impact on the way people assess
incidence rates (see Zillmann & Brosius, 2000), and experiments in journalism have corroborated
this. Such journalism studies, however, have not addressed the question as to how persuasive
combining the two kinds of information is. With only Allen et al. (2000) as a first step in the direction,
the question has not yet been resolved. Given that statistical evidence has been found to be a strong
type of evidence (Allen & Preiss, 1997) and that multiple pieces of evidence are more persuasive than a
single piece (additive model of Kim et al., 2012), it is expected that including statistical evidence in a
message with anecdotal evidence has a more positive effect on the persuasiveness than anecdotal
evidence alone:
H1: Anecdotal evidence taken from a sample presented as statistical evidence is more persuasive
than anecdotal evidence alone.
Similar and dissimilar anecdotal evidence
In the context of news reports, readers expect that journalists objectively select the exemplars from a
large sample of cases (Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). In the context of a sender with a persuasive intent,
however, readers expect that the senders make a specific choice for an anecdote, namely the anecdote
that best supports the claim they put forward (Zillmann & Brosius, 2000).
A relevant question is what makes for a good anecdote. Insights from argumentation theory help
to address this question. When evidence is used to support a claim, a line of argumentation is built.
Each line of argumentation can be characterized by the way in which the argument supports the
claim: the argumentation scheme (e.g., Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992). Argumentation
theorists have developed normative criteria that can be used to identify and evaluate argumentation
schemes (e.g., Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Walton, Macagno, & Reed, 2008). An argument
is stronger to the extent that it meets more normative criteria specified for a given argumentation
scheme. Studies have empirically compared evidence that differs to the extent to which it meets such
criteria. The results from these studies generally support the idea that complying with these criteria
makes for more persuasive evidence (e.g., Hoeken, Šorm, & Schellens, 2014; Hoeken, Timmers, &
Schellens, 2012; Hornikx & Hoeken, 2007).
What makes for the best anecdote depends on the type of claim. Anecdotal evidence can be connected
to two different argumentation schemes, depending on the claim: the argument by generalization and the
argument by analogy (Hoeken & Hustinx, 2009). In an argument by generalization, the generality of an
effect in the claim (e.g., “Family businesses in Spain benefit fromChinese investors”) is inferred from the
cases in the evidence. This means that for a strong argument by generalization, there should be a
sufficient amount of data (i.e., a number of cases in which Spanish businesses have indeed benefited from
326 HORNIKX
Chinese investments). Whereas this criterion is typically met by statistical evidence, it is not met by
anecdotal evidence. This is why empirical research comparing anecdotal with statistical evidence, which
wasmostly based on this argument by generalization, has found superior scores for statistical evidence on
beliefs and attitudes (Allen & Preis, 1997; Zebregs et al., 2015). Anecdotal evidence can also be part of an
argument by analogy. In that case, what is claimed to be true or probable for a case in the claim (e.g., “The
local food business Alvarez in Alicante will benefit from Chinese investors”) is supported by a case in the
evidence (e.g., “The food business Herrera in Almería recently got financial aid from Chinese investors,
and that help has been successful”). The quality of anecdotal evidence increases with the similarity with
the case in the claim (e.g., Walton, et al., 2008). For the Spanish case, what matters is that Alicante and
Almería share similar characteristics. If the quality increases, does that affect the persuasiveness of the
anecdotal evidence? A few studies have addressed this question.
Hoeken and Hustinx (2009, Study 3) showed that the similarity between the case in anecdotal
evidence and the case in the claim indeed affects the persuasiveness of anecdotal evidence: Similar
anecdotal evidence was more persuasive than dissimilar anecdotal evidence. Hoeken et al. (2012)
report the same result in a comparable study. In these two studies, participants were confronted with
short fragments of only claims with evidence. Hoeken and Hustinx (2007) examined whether readers
were also sensitive to quality manipulations when the claim and evidence were embedded in a longer
text. In the short text fragments, similar anecdotal evidence was found to be more persuasive than
dissimilar anecdotal evidence; in the longer text fragments with additional information irrelevant to
the evidence, this effect of similarity was absent. The messages in Hoeken (2001) were not just text
fragments but realistic texts: a real-life letter that proposed a policy for a given city. The anecdotal
evidence supporting this claim originated from a city that was similar or dissimilar to the given city.
In this study the impact of similarity was not observed: Both types of anecdotal evidence were
equally persuasive.
In summary, the quality of anecdotal evidence has been found to affect the persuasiveness of short
text fragments but not of longer text fragments or realistic texts. In all cases, however, the texts were
not relevant to the readers. Relevance of the topic, or issue involvement, is an important theoretical
determinant of the way in which people process persuasive messages (Chaiken, 1987; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986). It has been demonstrated that people are more sensitive to argument quality
when they are motivated to read a message that is relevant to them than when they are less
motivated (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Rucker, Bizer, & Cacioppo, 2004; but see Park, Levine,
Westerman, Orfgen, & Foregger, 2007). Theoretically, the quality of evidence should matter for
persuasiveness, certainly in situations with high issue-involvement (cf. Walton et al., 2008; Chaiken,
1987), but the expected difference between similar and dissimilar anecdotal evidence has not yet
been examined in a realistic text targeted at a relevant audience. The present study aims to fill this
gap by investigating whether the similarity of anecdotal evidence matters for readers when the
message is relevant to them:
RQ1: Is similar anecdotal evidence more persuasive than dissimilar anecdotal evidence in a real-life
message that is relevant to the readers?
Comprehension of the combination of anecdotal and statistical evidence
Whereas the persuasiveness of evidence types has been examined in a large number of experimental
studies, it has been largely neglected how people process evidence types in support of claims. In discourse
studies on argumentation, there has been research attention on the processing of arguments in discourse.
Voss et al. (1993), for instance, developed and tested amodel of argument processing, according to which
an important aspect is people evoking their own attitudes and beliefs when reading claims with
arguments. Studies have examined various aspects of human processing of arguments, for instance, in
terms of how quickly people respond to argumentative discourse (e.g., Wolfe, Tanner, & Taylor, 2013), to
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what extent they recognize the structure of such discourse (e.g., Chambliss &Murphy, 2002) or what they
recall exactly after reading such discourse (e.g., Britt, et al., 2007). This interest concerns argumentation
independently of the types of arguments. In the area of evidence types, Allen et al. (2000, p. 335) have
underlined the need for measuring what people do when they encounter evidence types: “One issue still
unresolved in the literature is the nature of cognitive processing.” Only two studies have examined this
issue. Kopfman et al. (1998) and Feeley, Marshall, and Reinhart (2006) both examined the cognitive
thoughts evoked after reading anecdotal or statistical evidence. Kopfman et al. (1998) expected and found
that a message with statistical evidence generatedmore cognitive thoughts than amessage with anecdotal
evidence. Feeley et al. (2006) replicated this study withmethodological improvements and were unable to
find the same results. What is relevant for the current study is how people process the combination of
anecdotal and statistical evidence, which is unknown. This study shares the interest of discourse studies
on argument processing but focuses on the comprehension of the specific combination of two types of
evidence: anecdotal and statistical evidence. Because anecdotal and statistical evidence are naturally
connected (the anecdote is part of the sample in the statistical evidence), it is useful to gain insights into
how peoplemake sense of this combination: Do they comprehend how they relate to each other? Insights
into how they comprehend this combination may improve our understanding of the persuasiveness of
this combination of anecdotal and statistical evidence:
RQ2: How do readers comprehend the combination of anecdotal and statistical evidence in a real-life
message that is relevant to them?
The present study consists of an experiment in which participants were given a realistic letter about
an environmental proposal of their own municipality. The letter contained similar or dissimilar
evidence, and did or did not contain statistical evidence.
Methods
Materials
Participants of two different cities in the Netherlands were given a letter from their municipality
concerning an environmental issue. Inhabitants of Nijmegen pay part of their environmental waste tax
through a tax on the price of particular litter bags. Inhabitants of this city were given a letter from their
municipality thta announced its decision to increase the price of these litter bags by 1 euro. The other
half of the participants from Arnhem received another letter, telling them their municipality con-
sidered increasing the price of 0.5-liter drink bottles with a €0.15 deposit to reduce waste on the streets.
Four versions of each letter were constructed. The letters differed with respect to the evidence
presented to support the claim that the price increase (of litter bags or of drink bottles) would keep
the town cleaner: Anecdotal evidence had a high or a low quality, and statistical evidence was or was
not presented. Appendix 1 provides the four versions of the text about litter bags.
All letters included anecdotal evidence. Anecdotal evidence consisted of another city where the increase
in the price of litter bags or of drink bottles had indeed helped to keep that town cleaner. The quality of
anecdotal evidence was manipulated through the degree of similarity between the anecdotal city and the
inhabitants’ city (cf. Hoeken, 2001): Half of the letters mentioned a similar city and the other half a
dissimilar city. In a previous study (Hornikx & Houët, 2009), the town of Tilburg (M = 4.14) had already
been found to bemore similar to Nijmegen than the town ofWassenaar (M = 2.08) (on a seven-point scale,
where a higher score implies a higher similarity). These two towns were used in the anecdotal evidence in
the litter bags letter: “A test in Tilburg/Wassenaar last year showed that an increase in the price of litter bags
has led to an improvement in the quality of waste disposal.” To stress the similarity between Nijmegen and
Tilburg, the letter mentioning Tilburg stated that both towns had an old center and a vibrant student
community. For the water bottle letter (Arnhem), a pretest was conducted among 53 people (age: M =
31.40, SD = 12.21; range, 19–60; 54.7%weremen; 45.3% indicated having obtained a bachelor’s degree). On
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a seven-point scale (where a higher score implies a higher similarity), the largest difference was found
between the town of Zwolle (M = 4.57, SD = 1.18) and the town of Middelburg (M = 2.57, SD = 1.12; F(1,
52) = 62.80, p < .001, η2 = .55). The similarity between Arnhem and Zwolle was highlighted in the letter
with Zwolle by indicating that both towns were medium-sized towns that were important logistical centers
in the eastern part of the country.
In half of the letters the general success of the price increase was mentioned by including statistical
evidence. For the litter bags letter, for instance, the text read, “The government has commissioned a test
in fourteen towns in the Netherlands last year. The test has shown that an increase in the price of litter
bags has led to an improvement of the quality of waste disposal. In the towns that participated a positive
result was found within a year.” The other half of the letters did not contain this statistical evidence.
The four versions of each letter were similar in layout and fonts. Each letter contained the
municipality’s address and logo and was signed by a fictitious municipal employee.
Participants
In total, 286 inhabitants took part in the study: 144 from Nijmegen, who evaluated the text concerning
litter bags, and 142 from Arnhem, who evaluated about the text concerning water bottles. On average,
participants were 32.40 years old (SD = 12.83; range, 16–80); 51.4% of them were women. The education
of participants ranged from elementary school to university (60.2% indicated having obtained a bache-
lor’s or a master’s degree). Aggregating over topic (litter bags or drink bottles), the four versions of the
letter (high-low evidence quality by presence/absence of statistical evidence) did not differ with respect to
the participants’ mean age (F (3, 282) < 1), their gender distribution (χ2 (3) = 4.37, p = .22), or their level
of education (χ2 (12) = 13.74, p = .32).
Design
The experiment had a 2 (quality of anecdotal evidence: strong, weak) × 2 (statistical evidence:
present, absent) × 2 (topic: litter bags or drink bottles) between-subjects design. Each version of the
letter was read by nearly the same number of participants (i.e., 35 or 36).
Instrumentation
The persuasiveness of the letter was measured with beliefs, attitudes, and intention. Beliefs were
assessed on the basis of two relevant beliefs, “Price increase [of litter bags/water bottles] leads to a
cleaner city” and “Price increase [of litter bags/water bottles] leads to a decrease of the amount of
waste in the city,” with three semantic differentials including “realistic–not realistic” and twice
“probable–improbable” (α = .88). Attitudes were measured with four 7-point differentials for a
statement (“The €1 litter bag price increase is” or “I believe deposits of €0.15 on half a liter bottles
are”), followed by four items: “good–bad,” “reasonable–not reasonable,” “not necessary–necessary,”
and “negative–positive” (α = .92). Intention was measured by asking participants whether they would
vote in favor or against the proposal (or whether they would abstain from voting; these cases were
excluded from the analyses).
The persuasion measures were followed by three manipulation checks. Perceived difficulty of the
letter was measured with three 7-point semantic differentials (α = .80), such as “easy–difficult” and
“complex–simple.” The perceived vividness of the letter was measured with three 7-point semantic
differentials, but because of the low reliability of the construct (α = .37), the analysis was done with
only one item: “concrete–abstract.” Finally, the perceived similarity between participants’ city and
the city in the anecdotal evidence was checked with a seven-point Likert scale (where a higher score
implies a higher similarity).
Only if statistical evidence was presented in the letter were participants’ cognitive responses about the
combination of anecdotal and statistical evidence elicited on the basis of two open questions. The first
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question was “In the letter, a test in fourteen towns in the country was mentioned. What is your opinion
about the writer’s choice to highlight [Similar_City]/[Dissimilar_City]?” Each response was coded by two
independent coders in two ways: the valence of the response (positive, negative, neutral; κ = .94) and the
content of the response (κ = .72). The content of the response was classified into four categories, of which
only one response indicated a sufficient level of comprehension: high/low comparability between the cities.
The other categories were, I do not know the anecdotal city, highlighting that another city is not important,
stating that it depends on the other cities in the test. For example, the answer “Bad, Wassenaar does not
resemble my own city” was coded as “negative” and as “low comparability between the cities.”
The second question was “One of the 14 towns was [Similar_City]/[Dissimilar_City]. What character-
istics do you think the other 13 towns in the test have? (for example, location or inhabitants).” Two coders
also analyzed responses to this question; five categories emerged (κ = .69). There were four categories of
thoughtful answers indicative of a sufficient level of comprehension: one reflecting the notion of representa-
tiveness of the towns in the sample for the larger population and three categories reflecting similarity
between the towns in the sample and the anecdote or the participants’ own town. An example of the
representativeness answer was “I hope they are a representation of the different towns in the Netherlands.”
Only one category was considered as not indicative of sufficient comprehension; this was the case if
participants only simply repeated the examples in the question: location and/or inhabitants. Table 1
provides examples for all categories of answers given in reaction to the two questions. For all three different
coding questions, coders reached agreement in the cases for which they originally had divergent codings.
Finally, participants’ relevant personal characteristics were assessed. When measuring the impact of
argumentative discourse, it is important to note that readers tend to stick their opinion before exposure to
the discourse (i.e., myside bias, see Wolfe & Britt, 2008). Therefore, participants’ attitude toward the
environment was assessed to control for possible differences between the participants in the different
conditions. Involvement with the letter’s topic was measured with four statements (inspired by Cho &
Boster, 2005) followed by seven-point Likert scales (α = .68). Two examples of such a statement were “I
believe it is important that Nijmegen is a clean town” and “The amount of waste in Nijmegen is an
important issue.” Participants’ environmental awareness was measured with a seven-point Likert scale “I
consider myself environmentally aware.” The questionnaire ended with questions about participants’ age,
gender, and level of education.
Procedure and statistical tests
Participants were approached at different locations in the two cities: the railway station, the city
center, and the university campus. Participation was voluntary, and there was no reward. After
Table 1. Coding categories with examples for comprehension.
What is your opinion about the writer’s choice to highlight [[Dis]Similar_City]?
Positive “Good choice”
Negative “I do not see any reason why [Dissimilar_City1] was mentioned”
Neutral “I do not know that town”
Comparability between the cities “Right, because [City2] is comparable to [Similar_City2]”
I do not know the anecdotal city “I am not familiar with the city of [Dissimilar_City1]
Highlighting another city is not
important
“I do not care which town it is provided that the results are true.”
Depends on the other cities in the test “It depends on what the other cities were”
What characteristics do you think the other 13 towns in the test have?
Representative “Cities from different provinces, with a different location in order to come to an
average”
Similar to anecdotal city “Comparable to [Dissimilar_City1]”
Similar to own city “Good connection to public transportation. Large population. A lot of green spaces”
Similarity in the sample “I think they all have the same kind of characteristics”
Repetition of the question “Inhabitants”
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participants had filled in the paper-and-pencil questionnaire, there was a debriefing. They were told
that the local university had created the letter and that their city was not considering increasing the
prices of litter bags or of drinking bottles. They also received this information in a written note.
H1 and RQ1 on the impact of including statistical evidence and the quality of anecdotal evidence
respectively were addressed with χ2 tests (for intention) and MANOVAs (for persuasion consisting
of beliefs and attitudes). RQ2 on the cognitive thoughts was addressed with χ2 tests.
Results
Aggregating across topic
The impact of the two independent variables of interest (anecdotal evidence quality, presence of
statistical evidence) on persuasion was investigated in two different letters, one for litter bags and one
for drinking bottles. There were no interaction effects between the two variables of interest and the topic
of the letter (Topic × Quality: F (2, 277) = 2.19, p = .11; Topic × Statistical Evidence: F (2, 277) < 1; Topic
× Statistical Evidence × Quality: F (2, 277) < 1). Therefore, the results below are presented across the two
topics (increasing the power of the statistical tests).
Manipulation checks
The four letters did not differwith respect to their perceived difficulty (F (3, 281) = 1.46, p= .23;M=5.22, SD
= 1.13) or perceived vividness (F (3, 282) = 1.82, p = .14; M = 4.06, SD = 0.92). The manipulation of the
quality of anecdotal evidencewas successful: The similar city (M=4.26, SD= 1.48)was perceived to bemore
similar to the inhabitants’ own city than the dissimilar city (M = 2.90, SD = 1.39; F (1, 182) = 63.55, p < .001,
η2 = .18). Finally, participants in the four letters considered themselves equally environmentally aware (F (3,
282) < 1;M=4.77, SD= 1.39) and indicated theywere equally involved in the topic of waste in their own city
(F (3, 282) < 1;M = 4.56, SD = 1.10).
Persuasiveness
H1 expected that anecdotal evidence taken from a sample presented as statistical evidence would
more persuasive than anecdotal evidence alone. A MANOVA (including beliefs and attitudes
together) showed no main effect of Statistical Evidence (F (2, 281) = 1.12, p = .33): Beliefs and
attitudes were not more positive when the anecdotal evidence was sampled from statistical evidence
than when it was presented in isolation (Table 2). When it comes to voting intention, participants
were not found to be more positive in the condition with statistical evidence (63.6% positive) than in
the condition without statistical evidence (61.3% positive; χ2 (1) = 0.12, p = .73).
RQ1 addressed the question whether the quality of the anecdotal evidence would affect persuasion. The
MANOVA (including beliefs and attitudes together) showed no main effect of Quality (F (2, 281) = 1.75,
p = .18): Beliefs and attitudes were not more positive when the anecdotal evidence was similar than when it
was dissimilar to the city in the letter (Table 2). When it comes to voting intention, participants were not
more positive in the condition with high-quality anecdotal evidence (66.7% positive) than in the condition
Table 2. Persuasiveness in function of presence of statistical evidence and quality of anecdotal evidence.
Attitudes Beliefs
Statistical Anecdotal M SD n M SD n
Absent High quality 4.39 1.76 72 4.18 1.68 72
Low quality 4.23 1.66 71 4.04 1.60 71
Present High quality 4.73 1.44 71 4.16 1.57 71
Low quality 4.46 1.70 72 4.43 1.62 72
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with low-quality anecdotal evidence (57.9% positive; χ2 (1) = 1.77, p = .18). There was no interaction effect
between Quality and Statistical Evidence (F (2, 281) = 1.60, p = .20).
Comprehension of anecdotal and statistical evidence
After reading a letter that contained both anecdotal and statistical evidence, participants were presented
with two questions about the anecdotal citymentioned in the letter, eliciting cognitive thoughts about the
combination of anecdotal and statistical evidence (RQ2). Most participants (89%) wrote down an
opinion about the selection of that city that was coded in terms of valence. Their opinions differed
significantly according to the manipulated similarity with their own city (χ2 (2) = 33.82, p < .001). That is,
73% of the responding participants were positive when they had read about similar city, whereas only
28% were positive when they had read about dissimilar city.
Sixty-five percent of the participants gave answers that could be coded in terms of one of four
relevant categories. It appeared that 72% of the responding participants referred to the (high or low)
similarity between the two cities, which is indicative of a sufficient level of comprehension. The other
three responses, which were not considered as demonstrating comprehension from the participants,
were relatively rare: 18% of the participants responded that they did not know the anecdotal city, 7%
indicated that the result counted and not the example city presented, and 3% responded that it
depended on the other cities investigated. There was no effect of the quality of anecdotal evidence on
the distribution of responses over the four categories (χ2 (3) = 2.92, p = .40).
The second question was about what characteristics participants assigned to the other 13 cities
mentioned in statistical evidence. Apparently, this question was hard for participants: Only 51% of the
participants responded. Of the 73 responding participants, 9 gave an answer that was already given in
the questionnaire (about the location of the cities and/or the inhabitants). As a result, 64 responding
participants provided an answer that was indicative of comprehension, which constitutes 45% of the
total number of participants. More than half of these responding participants referred to similarity in
one of three different ways (Table 3). The remaining participants indicated that the other 13 cities were
representative of a larger population. The responses in the five categories did not significantly differ
according to manipulated quality of the city that was mentioned in the letter (χ2 (4) = 8.62, p = .07).
Discussion
Whereas the persuasiveness of anecdotal evidence and statistical evidence has been subject to
numerous experimental investigations (see reviews by Allen & Preiss, 1997; Zebregs et al., 2015),
the potential impact of the combination of both types has hardly been examined. The present study
filled this gap by investigating the persuasiveness of this combination: Does the presence of statistical
evidence increase the impact of anecdotal evidence? Does the quality of anecdotal evidence affect the
persuasive outcome? And to what extent do readers comprehend the combination of anecdotal and
Table 3. Number of participants mentioning characteristics of the 13 other cities in the statistical evidence.
Anecdotal Evidence
Characteristics Total High Quality Low Quality
Representative 26 11 15
Similar 38 18 20
Similar to anecdotal city 15 5 10
Similar to own city 9 3 6
Similarity in the sample 14 10 4
Repetition of question 9 7 2
No response 70 35 35
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statistical evidence? These questions were addressed in the context of a realistic persuasive message
that was relevant to the readers.
The combination of anecdotal and statistical evidence was expected to be more persuasive than
anecdotal evidence alone on the basis of the results of Allen et al. (2000) and the additive model of
Kim et al. (2012), but H1 was not supported by the data. One potential explanation lies in a ceiling
effect of the anecdotal evidence: If anecdotal evidence in itself was very persuasive, it makes sense
that adding statistical evidence does not impact persuasion. However, it was determined that this
ceiling effect did not occur: For anecdotal evidence alone, scores on attitudes and beliefs did not
exceed 4.50 on a seven-point scale, and the percentage of positive voters was 61.3%. A second
potential explanation may lie in the difficulty people have in combining both the information from
the anecdotal evidence and from the statistical evidence. This is elaborated on in the discussion
below, when results of the comprehension of the combination of anecdotal and statistical evidence
are evaluated.
Half of the letters contained similar anecdotal evidence (high-quality) and half of the letters
contained dissimilar anecdotal evidence (low-quality). In this study, contrary to theoretical expecta-
tions, readers were not found to be sensitive to the quality of anecdotal evidence: The similar and
dissimilar variants were equally persuasive. This finding cannot be attributed to a failed manipulation:
The pretests were successful, and the question about the similarity between the city in the letter and
their own city was answered in line with the manipulation. The absence of an effect of evidence quality
may be explained by the manipulation being part of a longer text (cf. Hoeken & Hustinx, 2007). This is
the first study in which anecdotal evidence quality was examined in a real-life setting, with a realistic
letter that is relevant to the readers. Readers can be expected to be relatively highly motivated to
scrutinize a message that is relevant to them (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), but data from
this study show this does not lead to a differential impact of the quality of anecdotal evidence. This
result sheds light on previous research documenting an effect of evidence quality in laboratory setting
in which participants only read a claim with evidence (e.g., Hoeken et al., 2012, 2014; Hornikx &
Hoeken, 2007). In a setting that is close to real life, the quality of arguments may not matter much.
Finally, this study was the first to examine readers’ comprehension of the combination of
anecdotal and statistical evidence. When it comes to their thoughts related to the choice of
anecdotal evidence in this combination, 65% of all readers mentioned the (dis)similarity with
their own city when they were asked to write down what they thought about the municipality’s
choice of naming the city in the letter. In relation to the question as to what the cities in the
sample of the statistical evidence would look like, the results showed that 45% of the participants
were able to provide an answer that was indicative of comprehension of the combination of
anecdotal and statistical evidence. Some readers indicated they believed that the sample was
representative of all kinds of cities in the country. Other readers referred to the notion of
similarity, either referring to the anecdotal city in the letter, to their own city, or to the other
cities in the sample. In summary, some participants appeared to comprehend the relationship
between the anecdotal evidence and the statistical evidence by referring to the distinct notions of
representativeness and similarity.
More research is definitively needed to gain more insights into comprehension. The present study
examined cognitive thoughts that can be considered as the outcome of people’s processing of the
information in the argumentative letter. For future research, it would be very useful to examine the
online processing of this information, for instance, through sentence-by-sentence reaction times
(e.g., Wolfe, et al., 2013) or through think-aloud protocols (e.g., Whitney & Budd, 1996).
Another possible limitation of this study is related to the persuasion measures, which were self-
reported. The problem of self-report measures mainly affects behavior (Rhodes & Ewoldsen, 2013).
In the present study participants’ voting intention was used a proxy of voting behavior. Although the
naturalistic setting is likely to decrease the tendency to report inaccurate intentions, the use of this
self-report measure of behavioral intention is still a limitation.
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In conclusion, in real-life discourse, anecdotal evidence in a persuasive message that is relevant to
readers does not seem to benefit from the inclusion of statistical evidence or from its intrinsic
quality. The responses related to comprehension indicate that only a minority of participants
comprehended the relationship between anecdotal and statistical evidence. Future research is needed
to examine whether and how comprehension plays a role in the effects of additional evidence and
evidence quality.
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APPENDIX 1
Text of the material of the four conditions of City 1 (translation of the original Dutch text)
Dear citizen,
This letter informs you about a municipal decision with regard to the price of our municipal litter bags. The
municipality is planning to increase the price of these litter bags by 1 euro by next January 1.
[statistical and anecdotal evidence] [anecdotal evidence]
The government has commissioned a test in fourteen
towns [in our country] last year. This test has shown
that an increase in the price of litter bags led to an
improvement of the quality of waste disposal. In the
towns that participated a positive result was achieved
within a year.
[weak anecdotal] [strong anecdotal] [weak anecdotal] [strong anecdotal]
One of the towns
that participated





One of the towns that
participated in the test was
Similar_City1. This town has an
old, lively centre and a vibrant
student community, just like
City1. The municipality of
Similar_City1. . .
A test in the town of
Dissimilar_City1 last year
demonstrated that an increase in
the litter bag price led to an
improvement of the quality of
waste disposal. The municipality
of Dissimilar_City1. . .
A test in the town of
Similar_City1 last year
demonstrated that an increase in
the litter bag price led to an
improvement of the quality of
waste disposal. This town has an
old, lively centre and a vibrant
student community, just like
City1. The municipality of
Similar_City1. . .
. . . indicates that the higher budget resulting from the increased litter bag price has provided more opportunities to
keep the town visibly cleaner. Litter bags are collected on a more regular basis and waste treatment now functions
more efficiently.
. . . the municipality of City1 has decided to increase the litter bag price by 1 euro. In doing so, more can be done to
make City1 an even cleaner place.
If you have any questions concerning this topic, please feel free to contact the municipality office.
Yours faithfully,
Frits Steghel
Department of Environmental Affairs
[statistical and anecdotal evidence] [anecdotal evidence]
[weak anecdotal] [strong anecdotal]
Based on the test in fourteen towns . . . Based on the test in Dissimilar_City1 . . . Based on the test in Similar_City1 . . .
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